Apple’s Promised Privacy Feature for Wi-Fi Addresses Exposed as Ineffective


Apple has been hailed as a champion of privacy with its robust security features, but a recent revelation has shaken its reputation. A privacy-enhancing feature designed to conceal Wi-Fi addresses on iPhones and iPads has been exposed as ineffective. Despite promises that these addresses would be hidden and replaced with unique private ones for each network, Apple devices have continued to display the real addresses, potentially compromising user privacy. In this article, we delve deeper into the issue, its long-standing nature, and the implications it could have for Apple’s commitment to user privacy.

1. The Promise of Privacy: Apple’s iOS 14 Feature:

Apple introduced a privacy-enhancing feature in iOS 14, which aimed to hide Wi-Fi MAC addresses by default when devices connected to a network. Instead, a “private Wi-Fi address” was displayed, different for each network. This feature was further enhanced over time, allowing users to assign a new private address for a specific network.

2. The Discovery of a Critical Vulnerability:

Recently, Apple released iOS 17.1, which contained a patch for a vulnerability, known as CVE-2023-42846, that rendered the privacy feature ineffective. Security researchers Tommy Mysk and Talal Haj Bakry discovered and reported the vulnerability to Apple. Mysk revealed that the flaw had persisted since the release of iOS 14 in September 2020, rendering the entire feature useless, even when using a VPN or Lockdown Mode.

3. Understanding the Flawed Mechanism:

When a device joins a Wi-Fi network, it triggers a multicast message sent to all other devices on the network. To comply with network protocols, this message includes the device’s MAC address. Initially, with iOS 14, Apple introduced a different MAC address for each network, making it seemingly private. However, further investigation revealed that the actual, permanent MAC address was still broadcasted to all connected devices, albeit in a different field of the request.

4. Unveiling the Ineffectiveness: Real-Time Demonstrations:

Tommy Mysk published a video demonstrating how an Apple Mac, equipped with the Wireshark packet sniffer, can monitor network traffic. The video revealed that when an iPhone running iOS prior to version 17.1 joins the network, it shares its true Wi-Fi MAC address through port 5353/UDP. This real-time demonstration unveils the ineffective concealment of Wi-Fi addresses, casting doubts on Apple’s claims.

5. Implications and User Privacy Concerns:

The discovery of this flaw raises significant concerns about user privacy and the reliability of Apple’s privacy-enhancing features. With the Wi-Fi MAC address being broadcasted, it could potentially be leveraged by malicious actors for device tracking, targeted advertising, or other unauthorized purposes. Apple’s reputation as a pioneer of privacy will undoubtedly be affected, requiring swift action to restore user confidence.

6. Apple’s Response and Future Mitigation:

Following the publication of this vulnerability, Apple promptly released iOS 17.1 with the necessary patch. While this is a step in the right direction, it leaves questions regarding the effectiveness of previous iOS versions and the potential risks users faced in the interim. It will be crucial for Apple to conduct thorough audits of its privacy features and undergo stringent testing to prevent such vulnerabilities in the future.


Apple’s reputation as a leader in privacy has taken a hit with the exposure of an ineffective Wi-Fi address concealment feature. Users relied on this feature to protect their identities and enhance their privacy. The revelation that the real addresses were still being broadcast raises concerns about data security, device tracking, and potential misuse by third parties. Apple needs to address this issue promptly and transparently to regain the trust of its users and maintain its status as a privacy champion in the tech industry.

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